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1970—Economy m Transition
by NORMAN N. BOWSHLER
NFLATION gradually intensified in this country
from late 1964 to early 1970, and expectations of
future inflation were progressively revised upward.
The interruptions to output and the inequities caused
by redistributions of wealth and income resulting from
the inflation and inflationary expectations became a
serious domestic economic problem.
During 1970 inflation remained strong and per-
vasive, but the rate of price advance began receding
slowly. Inflation has become imbedded in thinking,
expectations, policies, contracts, and regulations. This
article: 1) points out some of the effects of inflation;
2) reviews the period during the inflation build-up;
3) examines actions taken to resist inflation before
1970; 4) discusses alternative courses of monetary
action for 1970; 5) traces the monetary actions
taken; 6) analyzes spending, production and price
developments in 1970; and 7) presents three courses
of monetary action for 1971.
I:~ffects of Inflation
Inflation is a rise in the average
level of prices or, stated in another
way, a decline in the purchasing
power of money.’ Because of the key
roles money and money-denominated
assets play, an unanticipated de-
cline in the value of money has
many effects on production and dis-
tribution. It affects holders of money
adversely, reduces the relative value
of outstanding bonds, mortgages,
savings accounts, and other dollar-
denominated assets, while giving
windfall gains to debtors. Those on
pensions and others having relatively
fixed incomes have less real buying
power with inflation.
1AII price increases are not inflationary. in
a dynamic growing economy with overall
price stability, some prices rise while others
decline. Factors affecting individual prices
include advances in technology, changes
in resource availability, amounts of capi-
tal invested, and changing consumer
tastes and preferences. Movements of in-
dividual prices serve the very useful func-
tions of equating supply and demand for
individual products and services and of
allocatinfi the nation’s resources. Attack-
ing inflation by controlling individual
prices does not get at the cmx of the
problem. Such a policy usnally creates
inequities and shortages and tends to stifle
growth and progress.
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Just as thcre are costs and inequities of adjusting
to a higher rate of inflation, there are costs and
inequities involved in adjusting to a rate of inflation
lower than anticipated. Contracts and other commit-
ments made on the expectation of continued inflation
become more burdensome to fulfill if inflation is less
than anticipated. When excessive spending is damp-
ened, many prices continue to move upward as an
adjustment to past excesses and inequities, causing
declines in production and unemployment.
The current inflation is likely to have pervasive
effects on redistributing income and wealth for a long
time. Costs of adjusting to inflation can be minimized
if the rate of inflation is stabilized for a prolonged
period. If inflation were stabilized at a zero rate, no
adjustments would be required to protect against a
changing purchasing power of money.
Accelerating Inflation
Total spending on goods and services rose at an
average 8 per cent annual rate from late 1964 to the
fall of 1969. Since there was little available excess
capacity. increases in real output were constrained by
the growth in the nation’s capacity to produce. The
rise in spending was roughly double the estimated
rate of real growth, and prices were gradually bid up
until, in 1969, overall prices rose more than 5 per cent.
The economy received many expansive shocks be-
ginning in 1964. Expenditures of the Federal Govern-
ment rose progressively relative to receipts until
mid-1968. Income tax rates were reduced in early
1964 to eliminate a “fiscal drag” and get the economy
moving. Reflecting the war in Vietnam, defense out-
lays of the Government, which had risen at a 1.3 per
cent annual rate from 1957 to 1964 (national income
accounts basis), increased at a 14 per cent rate from
1964 to mid-1968. Growth in nondefense outlays of the
Federal Covernment was also stepped up from the
9.8 per cent rate from 1957 to 1964 to a 12 per cent
rate from 1964 to mid-1968.2
Studies at this Bank indicate that these fiscal actions
alone were not sufficient to accomplish the rapid
growth in total spending and the acceleration of infla-
tion. Such Government actions may reallocate income
and resources and may effect the trend growth in
2
A summary measure of the Govermnent’s budgetary influ-
ence on the economy is provided by the high-employment
budget (a concept which eliminates the effect of changing
levels of business activity on the budget). This measure
shifted dramatically from a $13 billion surplus in 1963 to a
$14 billion annual rate of deficit in the first half of 1968.
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capacity. Initially they also have some influence on
total spending. However, the aggregate influence of
the Government budget on total spending is relatively
small if the resulting deficits or surpluses are financed
by the public out of planned saving rather than ac-
companied by changes in the money stock.3
Monetary actions were also very expansive begin-
ning in late 1964. By supplying more money than
the public desired to hold, given current levels of
income, wealth, and interest rates, the public’s de-
mand for other financial assets and for goods and
services was stimulated. From late 1964 to early
1969 money rose at a 5.3 per cent average rate, up
from a3per cent rate earlier in the decade and a
2 per cent rate in the Fifties. Except for the nine-
month period of restraint from the spring of 1966 to
early 1967, monetary expansion was at a very rapid
7 per cent average rate.
Actions Taken BiAarc 1979 to Resist Tnfiation
As the inflation problem built up, the Government
became concerned and took a number of actions de-
signed to restrain it. Unfortunately, many of the
actions were insufficient in magnitude, were based on
3
”Monetary and Fiscal Actions: A Test of Their Relative
Importance in Economic Stabilization,” this Review (Novem-
ber 1968), pp. 11-24, and “Monetary and Fiscal Influences
on Economic Activity — The Historical Evidence,” this Re-
view (November 1969), pp. 5-24.
Effects of changes in Govemment activities tend to be
crowded out by opposite movements in private spendin
when the Government finances its deficits with increase
debt to the public. See “The Crowding Out of Private Ex-
penditures by Fiscal Actions,” this Review (October 1970),
pp. 12-24.
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poor economic analysis, or had only delayed effects. the higher rates would restrain the expansion of in-
Thus they proved to be largely ineffective before
1970. Chief actions presumed and intended to be
anti-inflationary were using moral suasion to moderate
wage and price increases, permitting higher interest
rates, regulating credit, raising tax rates, reducing the
rate of growth of Government spending, and finally,
slowing the growth in money.
Moral Suasion — Before the acceleration of inflation
began in the mid-Sixties, the President’s Council of
Economic Advisers had presented a set of guideposts
for labor and management.’ The guideposts and other
appeals to the public were not effective in holding
down wages or prices when pressures became strong.
Workers and businessmen would not forgo returns
which were available to them. Even if they had, the
economy would have become less efficient, incentives
would have been reduced, shortages would have
developed, and resources would not have been at-
tracted into areas of greatest demand.
Interest Rates — Market interest rates increased
greatly from 1964 through 1969. Yields on highest-
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grade seasoned corporate bonds for example, went
up dramatically from 4.5 per cent in the early Sixties
to nearly 8 per cent in late 1.969. It was thought that
•Wages were to be raised no faster than the national trend
of productivity growth (estimated at about 3 per cent a
year), and prices svere to be established so as not to raise
profit margins.
vestment and other spending while stimulating saving.
The risc in interest rates was in response to a great
demand for loan funds by both the Government and
private sectors, The private sector demand derived
from the rapid growth in total spending and anticipa-
tions of inflation. With expected inflation. borrowers
were willing to pay higher rates to buy plants and
equipment because these items were likely to cost
more later.5 Rapid monetary expansion resulted, in
part, from the central bank attempting to moderate
interest rate increases in the short run. But the rapid
monetary expansion. by stimulating total spending
and thereby increasing inflation, led to still greater de-
mands for credit and higher interest rates than would
have occurred without such monetary expansion.
Credit Regulation — Regulation Q was administered
on the basis of a belief that it would help limit infla-
tion. This Regulation, which originated in 1935 under
quite different circumstances, was used to keep the
rates that banks were permitted to pay on time de-
posits below market rates during most of 1969, As a
result time deposits in commercial banks fell 5 per
cent in the year, after rising at a 14 per cent annual
rate in 1967 and 1968. Largely a~ a result, total credit
extended by commercial banks rose only 3 per cent
during 1969, following an 11 per cent rate in the two
previous years.
The total supply of funds, however, was not di-
minished; they flowed from supplier to ultimate
user through other channels, such as direct loans,
commercial paper, and the Eurodollar market,°Regu-
lation Q probably had little or no effect on either
total credit extended or total spending. Yet, by di-
verting funds through alternative routes, inefficiencies
and inequities developed. Homebuyers, small busi-
nesses, and consumers, who must rely on local finan-
cial institutions to obtain credit, were at a disadvan-
tage. Large businesses which could obtain funds in
central money markets received more funds and prob-
ably at lower rates than in the absence of the disin-
termediation. Small savers were penalized by the
low regulated rates received, while larger lenders
who have more alternatives received higher returns.
5
”Interest gates and Price Level Changes, 1952-69,” this
Review (December 1969), pp. 18-38. 6
1n suspending the ceilaig on 30- to 89-day large certificates
of deposit the Board of Govemors noted on June 23, 1970
that an expected increase “. ..in bank loans would not
constitute an increase in total credit flows, to the extent that
they simply represented a transfer of borrowings from other
financial avenues Federal Reserve Bulletin (July
1970), p. 605.
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Fiscal Actions — The Revenue and Expenditure
Control Act was signed into law on June 28, 1968.
The major features of the Act were a 10 per cent
surtax designed to reduce the amount of disposable
income and thereby slow private spending, and a re-
quirement that the growth of Government spending
be restricted. Federal outlays in the national income
accounts budget rose at a6per cent annual rate in
the last half of 1968 and in 1969, compared with a
13 per cent trend rate from late 1964 to mid-1968.
As a result of these actions, growth in total spending
was expected to slow by some mnultiple, placing im-
mediate downward pressure on prices.
These fiscal actions of mid-1968 did not produce
the results expected by their sponsors. Excessive
growth in total spending continued at only a slightly
reduced rate. Slower growth in spending by the Fed-
eral Government was largely offset by greater outlays
of those who were able to attract the funds formerly
flowing to the Government to finance its deficits.
Monetary Actions — Growth in the nation’s money
stock was slowed markedly in early 1969 in another
attempt to reduce the inflationary surge. Following a
rapid 7.6 per cent annual rate of money growth during
1967 and 1968, growth in money slowed in the first
seven months of 1969 to a 5.1 per cent rate, and to
a 1.2 per cent rate from July to February 1970. With
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demand for money, spending was expected to slow as
businesses and consumers attempted to conserve cash
balances.
As usually occurs after a change in the growth
trend of money, spending continued to be influenced
primarily by the previous trend of money growth for
about six months. Hence, spending continued to rise
excessively until the early fall of 1969, and inflationary
pressures intensified despite the monetary restraint.
Later in the year, total spending slowed, but prices
continued to rise in delayed response to the previous
excessive spending. Despite the actions taken, the
upward surge of prices continued to accelerate
through 1969.
Policy Alternatives at the Beginning of 1970
As 1970 began, the economic sjtuation was suffering
greatly from the fiscal and monetary actions of 1965
through 1968. The rate of overall price increase was
about 5.5.per cent a year at the end of 1969, after
accelerating for five years. Real production was not
expanding, unemployment was rising slightly, and
corporate profits were declining. Both bond and stock
prices were lower than a year earlier. On the favorable
side, the battle against inflation had begun to show
the first signs of success. The excess demand, which
was the major causal link to inflation, had been
moderated.
The crucial consideration for the nation in the com-
ing year was to determine how rapidly the price
effect of the past excesses could and should be extin-
guished. If restrictive monetary actions were aggres-
sively pursued, the rise in total demand for goods
and services might slow rapidly, and inflationary
pressures might be extinguished sooner than other-
wise. However, the transitional costs in terms of lower
production, employment, and incomes would be se-
vere, and the temptation would be strong to restimu-
late the economy before the task was completed, as
had been done in 1967.
On the other hand, if demand grew so rapidly as
to permit growth in production, employment, and real
incomes to continue at near their long-run optimal
trends, moderation of inflation might never be
achieved. In such a case, the country would continue
for a prolonged period to suffer inefficiencies and in-
equities caused by a continuous erosion of the value
of the dollar. Some middle course seemed more ad-
visable than either a quick vigorous correction or the
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cent in late 1970 and to about 5.5 per cent in late
1971. After two years of such a policy, the simulation
indicated the rise in prices would slow only gradually
from the 5.3 per cent rate in late 1969 to about a
5 per cent rate in late 1970 and to about a 4.5 per
cent rate in late 1971.
The choice was difficult. No policy alternative
promised a quick, painless elimination of inflation.
Fewer real goods and services would be available
because of lost production and unemployment, and
pain caused by inequities and inefficiencies of infla-
tion would continue. One lesson from the experience
was obvious; more care should be taken in the future
to avoid such mistakes as those of 1965 through 1968
which generated the strong inflationary momentum.
Monetary Actzonh. Dnring .1970
Early in 1970 the Federal Reserve System adopted
a more expansive policy and began placing more
emphasis on monetary aggregates in policy formula-
tion and implemncntation. Late in 1969 the System’s
Open Market Committee (the chief policymaldng
group) had directed the operating manager to main-
tain the prevailing firm conditions in money markets.8
This was a continuation of the policy which had re-
sulted in the slow growth of the money supply be-
ginning in July 1969.
At the January 1970 meeting a slight easing of
policy was adopted, and the manager was requested,
among other things, to seek a modest growth in money
and bank credit.° At the February meeting (and
most subsequent meetings for which directives have
been made public, after about a three-month lag) the
manager was requested to seek a moderate growth in
money and bank credit.1°The word “moderate” pre-
sumably implied more expansion than ‘modest.”
The word “moderate” in the directive was inter-
preted to nmeau different rates of expansion from one
meeting to another. In general, policy in terms of
money was initially to seek about a3per cent annual
rate of increase; at the May 5 meeting, the target was
raised to 4 per cent.” During the late Spring and
early Summer when fears of financial panic arose
svith the declines in security prices, the Committee
temporarily agreed that operations should be adjusted
as necessary to moderate unusual pressures in finan-
cial markets, should they develop. The money mar-
8
Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1970, pp. 273 and 278.
°FederalReserve Bulletin, April 1970, p. 339.
‘
0
Federal Reserve Bulletin, May 1970, p. 442.
“Federal Reserve Bulletin, August 1970, p. 631,
ket conditions specified in the meeting of May 26
were thought to be consistent \vith a 7 per cent rate
of money expansion from March to June.” At the
meeting of June 23, the Committee adopted a target
rate of about a 5 per cent growth rate in the money
supply from June to September.13 This target was
reaffirmed at meetings of July 21 and August 18 (the
last released record) ~14
The directives, however, were not without ambigu-
ity. Money was not the only aggregate to be con-
trolled; the Manager was also directed to obtain a
moderate growth in bank credit. Because of the re-
intermediation of time deposits following relaxations
of Regulation Q in January and in June and declines
in market interest rates, bank credit rose very rapidly.
It became clear that the System could not count on
obtaining the specific objectives with respect to both
money and bank credit. The primary emphasis was
placed on the money objective in the directive of
August 18. The bank crediteffects of the reintermedia-
tion were viewed as a substitution of bank credit for
other credit.
Even though the Committee sought a given rate
of growth in money, it was not intended that the
manager was to seek this trend rate each day, each
week, or even each month, The reason for not rigidly
applying the aggregate guide in the short run was to
avoid the gyrations in interest rates that was thought
might be produced by a strict adherence to the ag-
gregates. In these shorter periods the manager was
to operate, as previously, with an eye to money
market conditions. The conditions selected were those
thought to be consistent with a growth in the ag-
gregates at the desired rate over a period of about
three months. Whenever the aggregates appeared to
be deviating significantly from the desired path, the
manager was to permit changes in the money market
conditions to develop with an objective of getting the
aggregates on course. This procedure was not precise,
but largely a trial and error .approach. Also, money
market conditions were not always used merely as a
means to obtain the desired growth rate in money;
at times money market conditions became an end in
themselves to be considered along with the aggregate
targets.
From December 1969 to the four weeks ending
December 4, 1970 the mnoney stock rose at a 5.5 per
2
Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 1970, pp. 711-13.
l3Ibid., pp. 717-19.
“Federal Reserve Bulletins, October 1970, pp. 762-3 and
November 1970, p. 820.
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cent annual mate. This rate of increase was calculat d
on the basis of the revised series (November 1970)
and was slightly faster than the rate calculated using
the old series. Even though money grew on average
at about the desired rate, the performance may have
been accidental. From February to the four weeks
ending June 17, a period when there was an inten-
sification of money market pressures and some inter-
est rates rose, money expanded at a rapid 9 per cent
annual rate. From the four weeks ending June 17 to
the four weeks ending November 25, when money
market conditions eased markedly and interest rates
fell, money rose at a 3.7 per cent rate. This was
similar to the previous pro-cyclical tendency of the
System to inject money rapidly at times of huge
credit demands (usually acconmpanying stronger
business conditions), and to withdraw money or in-
ject it slowly at times of weak credit demands (usu-
ally accompanying contractions in business activity).
The pro-cyclical tendency of System actions when
formulated in money market conditions terms was
one reason for the System to shift to monetary aggre-
gates in the formulation and implementation of
monetary policy.
Studies at this bank indicate that temporary varia-
tions from trend, of the magnitude and duration of
those experienced during 1970, have no significant
effect on total spending, prices, production, or em-
ployment. If the deviations were larger or were al-
lowed to persist longer, they would have undesirable
results.
Money rose roughly 5 per cent in 1970, based on
quarterly averages of daily figures, increasing at an-
nual rates of 4 per cent from the fourth quarter of
1969 to the first quarter of 1970, 7.2 per cent from
the first to the second quarter, 5.3 per cent from the
second to the third, and an estimated 4 per cent
from the third to the fourth. During the Fifties and
early Sixties, a 5 per cent growth of money was
extraordinarily high and, if long maintained, tended
to cause accelerating inflation, With the strongly im-
bedded inflation in 1970, however, spending could be
permitted to expand faster than the growth of produc-
tive capacity and still place some downward pressure
on prices. By permitting a growth in spending at a
rate faster than in previous attacks on inflation, costs
in terms of lost production and unemployment mnay
be expected to he kept at relatively low levels.
Short-tenn interest rates declined sharply during
1970. There was a slowing in the demand for funds,
reflecting a moderated growth in spending following
from the monetary restraint of 1969. Also, there were
increasing supplies of short-term funds resulting frwn
the more rapid injection of money during 1970 and
from the temporary use of proceeds of long-term
financing. Yields on prime 4- to 6-month commercial
paper averaged 5% per cent in early December, down
from 9 per cent in early January. The three-month
Treasury bill rate was below 5 per cent in early
December, compared with nearly 8 per cent at the
begiuning of the year. Reflecting the same forces, the
rate charged prime business customers by commer-
cial banks was lowered from 8½per cent earl)’ in
the year to 8 per cent in March, to 7½per cent in
September and to 7 per cent in November. The dis-
count rate (the interest rate charged member banks
by Reserve Banks) was out of touch with market
rates early in the year, but as market rates declined
markedly, the discount rate was reduced from 6 per
cent to5½ per cent in November and early December
to keep it in line with other rates.
Long-term interest rates remained relatively high
during 1970; mnortgage rates changed little on bal-
ance while yields on municipal and Govermnent secu-
rities declined from peak levels. Yields on highest-
grade seasoned corporate bonds averaged about 7.8
per cent in early December, about the same as a
year earlier. The continued high rates, despite some
slowing in the growth of spending and presumably in
overall credit demands, reflected in considerable
measure the strongly imhcdded inflationary expecta-
tions. With great inflationary expectations, incentives
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to borrow long are increased while incentives to lend
at long term are reduced. Demands for long-term
funds may also have been bolstered by an attemupt to
improve liquidity.
Economic Developments in 1970
Total spending on goods and services rose at a 4.6
per cent annual rate during the four quarters ending
with the third quarter of 1970, despite some large
cutbacks in production of war goods. This was ap-
proximately the growth in spending the St. Louis
model had simulated given the monetary expansion
which occurred. In the fourth quarter spending was
interrupted by the major automobile strike, but much
of the loss is expected to be made up within a few
months after resumption of full production. By com-
parison spending rose at an excessive 8 per cent
average rate from late 1964 to late 1969.
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Prices continued to rise in 1970 as a result of pre-
vious expansionary fiscal and monetary actions and
consequent excessive total spending. However the ac-
celeration of price increases was stopped early in 1970,
and in the fall of the year signs became widespread
that inflation was receding moderately. Prices of the
sensitive thirteen raw industrial commodities have
declined since early 1970. Overall prices rose at a 4.4
per cent annual rate from the first to third quarter
and probably continued to rise at approximately that
pace in the fourth quarter. By comparison, these
prices went up at a 5.3 per cent rate from late 1968
to early 1970. Consumer prices have risen at a 5 per
cent rate since April, after increasing 6 per cent in
the previous twelve months.
Hourly earnings in manufacturing, adjusted to ex-
clude effects of overtime and intcrindustry shifts,
have risen 6.6 per cent in the last twelve months.
Adjusted for price increases, these earnings have in-
creased about 1 per cent. When the value of fringe
benefits is added, real earnings have probably in-
creased more than estimated output per man hour.
Nevertheless, these figures raise some doubt about
the belief that the recent inflation has been the result
primarily of a wage-push situation,
With prices rising about as fast as total spending,
production \vas changed little on balance during the
first three quarters of 1970. There was a small net
decline in the first quarter largely offset by slight
rises in the second and third quarters. Production
probably fell again in the final quarter of the year,
but this was mainly the result of the automobile strike
and probably did not reflect cyclical influences.
During 1970 the labor force grew, capital was in-
vested, and there were advances in technology. As
a result, productive capacity was rising while total
outpnt changed little on balance. Accordingly, re-
sources not utilized or underutilized increased. Com-
petition fromn these resources was the main force
which tended to reduce the upward momentum of
prices.
One indication of the utilization of capacity is pro-
vided by the employment rate. Employment declined
from 95.8 per cent of the labor force in the first
quarter of 1970 to about 94.5 per cent in the early
Fall. Later in the year employment drifted a little
lower in response to the interruption caused by the
auto strike, In terms of married men, employment
declined from 98 per cent early in the year to 97.1
per cent in the Fall.
All unemployment does not represent excess capac-
ity. Workers leave jobs in search of better opportuni-
ties; some activities are seasonal; some people have
but marginal production capacity; and some become
Government spending rose more rapidly than pri-
vate spending in 1970. Federal Govermnent expendi-
tures rose at a 7.4 per cent annual rate in the first
three quarters of the year, state and local government
outlays expanded at an 11.1 per cent rate, and private
spending increased at a 4.4 per cent rate. Defense
outlays were reduced at a 5 per cent rate, while
spending on all other programs of the Federal Gov-
ernment rose at a rapid 16 per cent rate.




range. In the economic expansion
between the 1958 and 1960 reces-
sions, unemuployment reached a
low of 5 per cent. In 1958 and again
in 1960 when downward pressure
was applied to inflationary pres-
sures, unemploymnent rose tempo-
rarily to 7 per cent and above. When
unemployment remained below a
5 per cent rate in 1965 through 1969,
inflationary pressures intensified.
Given minimum wage laws and
other features of American labor
markets, it may be that 5 per cent
rather than4 per cent or less unem-
ployment is about the practical
non-inflationary minimum. Attempts
to maintain the unemployment rate
at some artificially low level may
succeed temporarily but ultimately
will onlyassure accelerating inflation, & N N~
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unemployed temporarily when bus-
inesses are forced to cut back or
close because they are no longer
competitive. Comparisons with pre-
vious periods may be helpful in
evaluating the present unemploy-
ment rates. The recent 5.8 per cent
rate of unemployment (including
strike effects) compares with a 5.2
per cent rate in 1964, the last year
of pronounced economic expansion
without accelerating inflation, In
1962 and 1963 unemployment re-
mained in the 5½ to 6 per cent
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Another measure of the utilization of labor is the
number of people actually working relative to the
civilian population of workmng force age. The Novem-
ber level of 63.7 per cent is down from the peak,
but still higher than anytime in the Fifitics or Sixties
before late 1966. Another indication of the magnitude
of the cmploymnent situation is the duration of un-
employment. This past fall the average length of
uneniployment was about 9 weeks, up from about 8
weeks in 1969, hut still substantially below the 12
weeks or longer from 1958 to early 1965.
Corporate profits, after taxes, declined from a peak
of $49.7 billion in the second quarter of 1969 to $45.4
billion in the third quarter of 1970. Since the inflation
began increasing in 1965, corporate profits have de-
clined from 6.8 per cent of gross national product to
4.6 per cent.
Policy Choices for 1971
As the new year begins, the critical question still
remains, “How rapidly should the nation proceed in
reducing inflation?” Prices arc rising more slowly
now than a year ago, and sonic further downward
pressure has been accumulated that may be expected
to reduce the inflation further in 1971. Even so, prices
are likely to continue rising at a rather fast pace. At
the same time, production is below capacity, some
are unemployed, and the economy is sluggish.
The choice for the nation, as a year ago, is one
of the lesser of evils. It serves no purpose to pretend
there is an easy, costless, quick cure to inflation. The
adverse consequences of the mistakes of 1965-68 con-
tinue to bear heavily on the nation. To focus solely
on either the inflation or the capacity utilization prob-
lem is apt to intensify the pain and suffering from
the other. Sonic comnpromise has to be made. This
Bank has again made simulations of prospective eco-
nomic conditions, assuming various courses of mone-
tary action. For the model simulations, Federal
Government expenditures through second quarter of
1971 have been estimated by this Bank and have
been projected thereafter to grow at an 8 per cent
annual rate. The calculated figures were smoothed
judgementally in the lower half of the table on page
12 to remove irregular fluctuations.
One course of action which might be followed
would be to continue to seek a 5 per cent growth
rate of money, the rate planned in the last-released
record of pohcy actions. With such a growth of money,
total spending growth might accelerate from the 4.5
DECEMBER 1970
per cent rate of the past year to about a 6.5 per cent
rate in late 1971. If such a growth of money were
maintained, spending might be expected to continue
to grow at about the 6.5 per cent rate in the first half
of 1972. Real output. which declined slightly in the
past year, would probably be growing at about a
2.5 per cent rate a year from now. These simulations
are designed only to project most probable cyclical
and trend influences of money and the Federal budget
on the economy. They do not purport to project
erratic short-term developments, such as a bulge in
spending and production after the auto strike and
any dip in case of a steel strike.
The model indicates that with the 5 per cent growth
of money, inflation would most likely still remain
strong at the end of next year, with overall prices
rising at about a 4 per cent annual rate. Recently,
prices have been rising ~tt about a 4.5 per cent pace.
Unemployment would most likely move up from the
recent 5.5 per cent of the labor force (excluding
strike effects) to around a 6 per cent level.
If the nation desired a quicker approach to reduc-
ing inflation, a 2 per cent growth rate of money
might be undertaken. The simulation indicates that
spending under this policy might be down to about
a 3.7 per cent growth rate a year from now. In-
flation would be reduced slightly faster than ‘with
the 5 per cent rate of growth of money, dropping to
about a 3.5 per cent rate a year from now and to
about a 2.8 per cent rate by mid-1972. Production,
however, would be very sluggish, and unemployment
might rise to about 6.5 per cent of the labor force in
late 1971 and to over 7 per cent by mid-1972. With
unemployment at such a level, the temptation to
restimulate the economy would become great re-
gardless of inflationary consequences.
If it is desired to attempt to hold the adjustment
costs in terms of lost production as low as possible
in 1971 and early 1972 while placing some down-
ward pressure on prices, a faster 8 per cent rate of
mnoney growth mnight be selected. In this case, model
simulations indicate that spending might rise to about
a 9.5 per cent growth ratein the Fall of next year and
remain at that pace in the first half of 1972. Produc-
tion would be rising at faster than an assumed 4 per
cent long-term trend in late 1971 and in early 1972,
and unemployment would probably not reach 6 per
cent and would be declining in late 1971 and in early
1972. Prices, however, would continue to rise for a
long, long time, since the rate of increase would be
inching down very slowly. The total cost in lost pro-
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Table II
Current Projections of Total Spending, Real Produci, Prices, Unemployment, and lnteresf Rates
1970 1271. 1972
Ill IV I, II Ill IV I, II
Actual EmIl mated . Proj.:ction
Assumed R&es of Chance
i,n Marcy Stock AS GENERATED DIRECTLY BY THE ST. LOUIS MODEL
2 Per Cent
Annual Rate of Change in:
Nominal GNP 6.1’ 6.3;: 55~ 4.3 6.2 ‘ 3.1 2.7 3.5
Real GNP 1.4 16 1.0 0.1 2.) 0.6 --0.6 0.6
GNP Price Deflator 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.2 4.0 3.7 3.3 2.9
Unemployment Rate 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.9 6.2 6.3 6.7 7.0
Corporate Aoa Rate 8.2 7.9 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.5 7.3
5 Per Cent
Annual Rote of Change in:
Not&nal GNP 6.) 63 6.1 6.1 9.0 6.4 5.8 6.5
Real GNP 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.7 47 2.3 2.0 3.0
GNP Price Deflator 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.5
Unemployment Rate 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.8 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.3
Corporate Aaa Rate 8.2 7.9 7.9 7.9 /.9 7.7 7.6 7.4
Per Cent
Annual Rate of Change Inc
Nominal GNP 6.1 6.3 6.8 78 ii 9 9.6 8.9 9.6
Real ClIP 1.4 1.6 2.2 3.4 7.3 5.2 4.6 5.3
ClIP Price Deflator 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.1
unemployment Rate 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.6 5.5 5.5
Corporate Aaa Rate 8.2 7.9 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.5
AS SMOOTHED TO REMOVE IRREGULAR FLUCTUATIONS
2 Per Cent
Annual Rate af Change in
Nominal C-NP 5.6. 6.0 5.7’~ 4.8’. 4.1 3.7 . 3~ 3.5.
Real GNP 0.9 1.4 1.2 0.6 01 —-0— 0.3 0.7
ClIP Price Deflator 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.2 4.0 3.7 3.3 2.8
Unemployment Rate 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.9 6.2 6.3 6.7 7.0
corporate Aaa Rate 8.2 7.9 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.7 75 7.3
5 Per Cent
Annual Rate of Change n:
Nominal GNP 5.6 6.0 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Real GNP 0.9 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 3.0
GNP Price Defla’ar 4.7 4.6 45 4.3 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.5
Unnrrplayner.t Rotc 5 7 5.4 5 6 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.2
Corporate Aaa Rote 8.2 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.4
S Per cent
Annual Rate of Change in
Nominal ClIP 5.6 60 7.2 8.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.6
Real GNP 0.9 1.4 2.7 4.1 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.5
ClIP Price Deflator 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.1
unemployment Rata 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.6 5.5 5.4
Corporate Aaa Rate 8.2 7.9 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.5
b::’ ‘ ..‘. nc..,,’— c_’ ‘he .1,1 Ii’ ‘.ini ‘‘‘:,,,c,~ “.1 1: ‘cc’’. :l ci.::. sh—,s::h
~ ,..,..,. ~ 11:,...:. .rc.~ .—— nIt—I ic,T —nil,.:,:. i’ t
1
fl 1,1.1 Ii:’2’.—cr,..c..’,.,c’,:’c., rU
,‘‘i’,idaL I,,.,, .~‘rI;I’’j(’,.,,(~~ i fl~J•I~~ ~ j’.. . fl.,.n~ ,: Pc’’~: ,.~rcc.—. .1,.
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duction might be as great or greater under this course,
if price stability is ever to be achieved, as it would he
under a more aggressive approach, since actions to
dampen inflation would have to be continued much
longer.
Conclusions
Inflation in recent years has been one of the
nation’s most serious domestic economic problems. It
causes inequities and inefficiencies, and prejudices
the future viability of the economic system. The
process of its elimination is inevitably causing an
underutilization of labor and other resources. The
first effective steps in eliminating the inflationary mis-
takes of 1965-68 were taken by the monetary authori-
ties in 1969, yet price increases continued unabated
throughout that year. Monetary actions were relaxed
in early 1970 but have continued to be anti-inflation-
ary. During 1970 the rate of inflation began ebbing,
with overall prices rising at an estimated 4.5 per cent
rate no~v,compared with a 5,5 per cent rate a year
ago.
The transition to a lower rate of inflation has been
painful for many. Real product has increased little, if
at all, and contracts based on expected continued
rapid inflation are costly to fulfill. Yet, given the
strongly imbeddcd inflation, the costs of reducing it
have not been so great as one might have anticipated
from previous attempts at arresting inflation in this
country. Studies at this Bank indicate that the cut-
backs in production and employment in the 1969-70
battle against inflation were smaller because the na-
tion’s money stock was not permitted to decline, as
it did in previous periods of correction. Since early
1969 money has expanded at an average 4 per cent
annual rate.
Simulations using the Bank’s model indicate that if
money continues to rise moderately, further progress
will be made in 1971 in reducing the pace of price
increases. However, the battle will not be won easily
and without cost. Expectations of rising prices are
still strong. Some prices, such as those in term con-
tracts and union wages, were relatively inflexible
during the excessive spending of the late 1960’s. Other
prices were temporarily held back by inertia, a money
illusion, lack of knowledge of costs, public opinion
and Government regulation. As these wages andprices
now move toward equilibrium levels, the increased
production costs place upward pressure on other
prices.
Some believe that prices and wages could be held
stable with much less cost by merely “controlling”
them. It seems so simple to just have the Government
outlaw inflation. Suggestions have taken a variety of
forms from a broadscale rigid control of all prices,
with severe penalties for violations, to a temporary
freeze, to a control of certain key prices, and even to
using persuasive tactics called “jawboning.” Yet, past
attempts to control prices both here and abroad in-
dicate that such controls have been largely ineffective.
Controls are frequently circumverted through black-
markets, quality deterioration, clever pricing, or other
devices. Controls are costly to adminster, impinge on
freedom, create shortages (usually requiring ration-
ing), mnisallocatc resources, and frequently slow the
rate of economic growth.
A contribution can be made to a more rapid solu-
tion of the problems of inflation and underutilization
of capacity by improving the market system. Such ac-
tions might include reducing subsidies, tariffs and
import quotas, wideuing the scope of the anti-trnst
laws to cover more monopolistic practices, increas-
ing the skills of workers, eliminating outdated build-
ing codes and other barriers to greater productivity,
and modifying the minimum wage laws in the inter-
est of improving job opportunities for teenagers and
the handicapped.
Progress has been made on the inflation problem.
Costs have occurred in reducing it, but so far they
have been less than in any previous attempt. Con-
tinued perseverance along the general course charted
in the past two years would seem to be appropriate
in 1971. As long as total spending continues to grow
at a moderated rate, both the inflation and the capac-
ity utilization problems wifi he gradually solved as
the effects of past maladjustments atrophy. Experi-
ence demonstrates that Government actions designed
to shock the economy into a quicker adjustment
have usually had net adverse consequences.
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